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1. Introduction 
In July 2014, the five mobile app platforms, through which applications are available for 
download, were offering a total of 3,170,000 apps. The two main platforms, namely Google Play 
and the App Store offer 2,500,000 apps between them,2 dominating the market for access to apps. 
According to Apple, app downloads between 2008 and 2013 amounted to 50 billion averaging 
800 hundred downloads per second.3 Just a year later that number grew by 50% reaching 75 
billion downloads.4 The time users spend on apps is also continuously increasing,5 pointing to an	  
“app boom”.6 Moreover, the huge popularity of apps is leading consumers to living an “app-
driven life”,7 entailing the use of apps “to navigate through life – shopping, playing, reading, 
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dating, learning, and more…”8 Indeed, apps are now more than simple pieces of software 
enabling a variety of tasks on mobile devices.  
Game apps are dominating the market place for the time being.9 But other ‘useful’ applications 
are quickly catching up: from maps to weather applications, train booking services or flight 
boarding passes and everything in between. Business models are also quickly evolving. The 
main models include paid app, ‘paidmium’ where further content to use on a paid app is 
available for purchase and ‘freemium’, where the app is free but further content requires 
additional purchase. Other models may include free apps that are financed by the placement of 
adverts or the use, or even the sale of the personal details of the user.10  
The success of apps with users engenders a number of legal issues, many of which are beyond 
the remit of this chapter. This chapter provides an essential starting point to reflecting on the 
legal challenges in relation to consumer protection. It cannot be exhaustive. Two key issues are 
explored. They relate to the contractual rights of consumers using applications as well as the 
liability of application providers and retails platforms for misleading advertising. Those are areas 
in the EU that are chiefly coming under the remit of Directive 2011/83/EU on Consumer 
Rights11 (DCR) and Directive 2005//EC on Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD).12 
The Directive on Consumer Rights amends and consolidates pre-existing legislation in the field 
of distance sales and doorstep sales. It offers consumers in the EU a number of rights, protecting 
them when purchasing from a business. The Directive also introduces legislation controlling the 
sale of digital content. Those rights are essential components of EU Consumers’ right arsenal, 
but are not necessarily well adapted to the app world as the below explores. The UCPD 
meanwhile offers protection (mostly by means of public enforcement and private redress in most 
member states) against a number of commercial practices that are considered unfair, including 
advertising. This legislation is able to protect consumers, but its application also poses 
challenges in the app world.   
2. Applying the DCR in the app world 
According to Recital 19 DCR, ‘digital content means data which are produced and supplied in 
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digital form, such as computer programs, applications, games, music, videos or texts, 
irrespective of whether they are accessed through downloading or streaming, from a tangible 
medium or through any other means.’ Applications therefore fall within the remit of the 
Consumer Rights Directive and can be treated as digital content. Digital content, defined in 
Article 2(11) DCR as “data which are produced and supplied in digital form”, follows a sui 
generis legal regime.13 Under the DCR, digital content is neither subject to the rules applying to 
goods or services although it is primarily inspired by the sale of goods. It offers tailored rights 
and remedies due to the intangible nature of the content taking direct account of the hybrid 
character of digital content.14 This gives consumers a right to information but they are normally 
barred from a right to withdraw from the purchase of digital content. Rights concerning the 
quality of the digital content received also exist under separate legislation, but are beyond the 
remit of this chapter.15 
2.1 Right to information 
The rights laid out in the DCR were informed by a large number of problems identified prior to 
the legislation being adopted. Research conducted in 2010 for Consumer Focus in the UK found 
that consumer information was of low quality, demonstrated by lengthy contracts, complex 
wording and widespread use of legal jargon. Only 43 per cent of mystery shoppers understood 
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their responsibilities when buying digital products and 35 per cent understood their rights.16 
Those results were consistent with those uncovered by a survey in 2011 for the European 
Commission, led by Europe Economics, which showed that consumer detriment was mostly 
located in information and transparency with regards to digital content. Out of the problems 
identified, information issues represented 42% of the reported most recent problems. Lack of 
information (24%) was mostly problematic followed by unclear/complex information (18%).17 
While this study was conducted before clear information and transparency rules were spelt out 
for consumers buying digital content, it is important to note that, at the time, the Distance Selling 
Directive18 was in place and effective in the Member States. Rules on services were also existent 
in most countries. Yet, information about digital product was not forthcoming. One of the main 
reasons identified for this lack of information, is that the legal regime was ambiguous and not 
harmonized across Member States.19  Indeed, the classification of digital content as goods or 
services on which much of the existing legal regimes were underpinned varied from one Member 
State to the next.20  
The DCR introduced a number of common rules, although their efficacy remains to be tested. 
The right to information applies to the purchase of applications as well as content purchased in-
app. The rules also apply whether the app or its content are provided on a tangible medium or are 
dematerialized.21 It is also applicable whether or not the consumer pays for the digital content,22 
although when content is free he/she should have lower expectations in particular with regards to 
quality and functionality.23 The burden of proof of the provision of the required information rests 
on the trader.24 
Article 5 sets out the rules for information requirements for contracts other than distance or off-
premises contracts and in some limited instance will apply to the purchase of applications. 
However, by and large, applications and in-app purchases will take place at a distance. The 
obligations set in Article 6 are therefore the most relevant. This Article requires that ‘before the 
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  Legal	  Affairs	  
(Amsterdam	   Law	   School	   Research	   Paper	  No.	   2012-­‐71,	   Centre	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   European	   Contract	   Law	  Working	  
Paper	  Series	  No.	  2012-­‐08,	  2012),	  available	  at	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2087626.	  
24	  Article	  6(9)	  DCR.	  	  
consumer is bound by a distance or off- premises contract, or any corresponding offer, the trader 
shall provide the consumer with a set of information in a clear and comprehensible manner. The 
set is composed of no less than 20 pieces of information.25 Those obligations are complemented 
by information requirements under Article 5 of the Electronic Commerce Directive (ECD).26 In 
addition, Article 8 DCR imposes some transparency requirements to ensure that consumers are 
fully aware of the charges and conditions imposed by retailers and in our case also, app 
developers. This includes the use of plain and intelligible language, legibility and the use of a 
durable medium.27 Article 8(9) makes it clear that transparency requirements under the DCR are 
without prejudice to the provisions on the conclusion of e-contracts and the placing of e-orders 
set out in Articles 9 and 11 ECD.  
2.1.1 Generic information  
Some information is generic and not specifically tailored to the purchase of applications or in-
app purchases, although it may cause particular problems in this context.  
This includes an obligation to inform the consumer on the main characteristics of the goods or 
services, to the extent appropriate to the medium and to the goods or services.28 For mobile 
applications this therefore may require some adaptation compared to other digital content that 
may be downloaded via websites on a computer or seen on a tablet.29 The rules in place, even the 
most recent ones, were not drafted with App stores in mind.30 Indeed, apps, mostly designed for 
use on mobile phone or other handheld devices, are designed for convenience and are not able to 
carry the same level of details. Further, app users would seldom require long descriptions of the 
main characteristics of the application itself. Recital 36 explains that in ‘the case of distance 
contracts, the information requirements should be adapted to take into account the technical 
constraints of certain media, such as the restrictions on the number of characters on certain 
mobile telephone screens or the time constraint on television sales spots. In such cases the trader 
should comply with a minimum set of information requirements and refer the consumer to 
another source of information, for instance by providing a toll free telephone number or a 
hypertext link to a webpage of the trader where the relevant information is directly available and 
easily accessible.’ Article 8(4) specifies that the information to be provided includes “the	  main	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  goods	  or	  services,	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  trader,	  the	  total	  price,	  the	  right	  of	  withdrawal,	  
the	   duration	   of	   the	   contract	   and,	   if	   the	   contract	   is	   of	   indeterminate	   duration,	   the	   conditions	   for	  
terminating	  the	  contract(…).”  For applications purchased via Google play or the Apple App store, 
information about each app is normally available prior to purchase and includes the technical 
requirements of each app, the main characteristics of the app, i.e. what the app does, some 
screenshots of the app, other users’ reviews, details about the developer, etc. Some information is 
available via hyperlinks, which, according to Recital 36, is acceptable.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Article	  6(1)	  (a)	  to	  (t)	  DCR.	  	  
26	  Directive	  2000/31/EC	  on	  certain	  legal	  aspects	  of	  information	  society	  services,	  in	  particular	  electronic	  commerce,	  
in	  the	  Internal	  Market	  (‘Directive	  on	  electronic	  commerce’)	  O.J.	  L178	  (2000).	  
27	  Article	  8(7)	  DCR.	  	  
28	  Article	  6(1)	  (a)	  DCR.	  	  
29	  Those	  indeed	  have	  technical	  particularities	  that	  make	  them	  friendlier	  than	  mobile	  apps,	  see	  below	  at	  p.	  	  	  
30	  Arno	  R.	  Lodder,	  Information	  requirement	  overload?	  Assessing	  disclosure	  duties	  under	  the	  E-­‐Commerce	  Directive,	  
Service	  Directive	  and	  Consumer	  Directive,	   in	  Savin	  Andrej	  and	  Trzaskowski	   Jan	   (eds.),	  Research	  handbook	  on	  EU	  
Internet	  Law	  (2014).	   
Another piece of information concerns the identity of the trader31 and his contact details. Article 
6(8) DCR states that the information requirements laid down are in addition to information 
requirements contained in Directive 2000/31/EC.32 Under Article 5 ECD, the trader must also 
provide any registration number to trade register or equivalent as well as VAT information if 
applicable. The geographical address at which the trader is established and the trader’s telephone 
number, fax number and e-mail address, where available, are also required under the DCR, to 
enable the consumer to contact the trader quickly and communicate with him efficiently.33 This 
means that providers of apps can dispense with a number of means of communication available 
to consumers, even though given that apps are offered online, app providers would qualify as 
providers of information society services under the ECD and thus, be under an obligation to 
provide an email address pursuant to Article 5(1)(c) ECD.  
2.1.2 Information about the price  
Some of the most controversial issues to date to mar the success of applications have revolved 
around pricing and lack of transparency.34 This lack of transparency experienced by consumers is 
anchored in the fact that the business models adopted by the app industry are still quite foreign to 
consumers. 35 ‘Fremium’, the business model that dominates games, is spreading steadily to non-
game applications.36 Fremium applications are free to download and offer some basic features to 
use but consumers have to pay to purchase additional features. As a result, the total price payable 
by the consumer may not be easily calculated other than on a transaction-to-transaction basis. 
Yet according to Article 6(1) DCR, this price must be “inclusive of taxes, or where the nature of 
the goods/services or digital content is such that the price cannot reasonably be calculated in 
advance, the manner in which the price is to be calculated, as well as, where applicable, all 
additional freight, delivery or postal charges and any other costs (…)”. As a result, it is 
paramount that when first downloading an app the consumer is made aware of the individual 
pricing structures and how prices will be calculated for any in app purchases that may follow. 
While prices for paid apps are normally displayed on Google play or the Apple App store, prices 
of further purchases tend to be more difficult to identify. However, the description of the app 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Article	  6(1)	  (b)	  DCR.	  	  
32	  Note	  that	  Article	  6(8),	  para	  2	  DCR	  also	  states	  that	  in	  case	  of	  conflict	  the	  DCR	  shall	  prevail.	  
33	  If	  the	  trader	  is	  being	  represented,	  similar	  requirements	  exist	  under	  Article	  6(1)(c)	  and	  (d)	  DCR.	  	  
34	  Across	  platforms	   the	   same	  app	  may	  not	  be	   retailing	  at	   the	   same	  price.	   For	  example,	  Angry	  Birds	  was	   free	  on	  
Google	  Play	  but	  costs	  £3.99	  on	  Apple	  App	  Store.	  As	  consumers	  are	  more	  or	  less	  captive	  because	  of	  technological	  
requirements,	  price	  competition	  is	  an	  issue	  in	  the	  app	  market,	  but	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  remit	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  
35	  In-­‐app	  advertising	  is	  also	  developing	  with	  over	  40	  %	  of	  publishers	  surveyed	  using	  advertising	  on	  their	  paid	  app	  to	  
generate	  further	  revenues.	  See	  Mobile	  App	  Advertising	  and	  Monetization	  Trends	  2012-­‐2017:	  The	  Economics	  of	  
Free,	  IDC,	  App	  Annie	  (March,	  2014),	  available	  at	  
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.appannie.com/reports/App_Annie_and_IDC_Mobile_App_Advertising_and_Mon
etization_Trends_2012-­‐2017/App_Annie_and_IDC_Mobile_App_Advertising_and_Monetization_Trends_2012-­‐
2017.pdf.	  There,	  some	  obligations	  befall	  the	  providers	  under	  Article	  6	  ECD,	  which	  requires	  that	  commercial	  
communications	  be	  clearly	  identified	  as	  such.	  Under	  Article	  2(f)	  ECD,	  a	  commercial	  communication	  is	  defined	  as	  
‘any	  form	  of	  communication	  designed	  to	  promote,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  the	  goods,	  services	  or	  image	  of	  a	  company,	  
organisation	  or	  person	  pursuing	  a	  commercial,	  industrial	  or	  craft	  activity	  or	  exercising	  a	  regulated	  profession’.	  
There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  apps	  carrying	  adverts	  as	  a	  revenue	  making	  exercise	  will	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  
provision.	  Also	  see	  Recital	  29	  ECD.	  	  
36	  See	  Mobile	  App	  Advertising	  and	  Monetization	  Trends	  2012-­‐2017:	  The	  Economics	  of	  Free,	  IDC,	  supra	  n.35. 
now normally mentions that the app offers in-app purchases and provides a price range for in-
app purchases. This is for example the case for Angry Birds on Google Play, indicating that in-
app products are available for €0.72 - €35.69 per item.37 Yet, this has only been after authorities 
have objected to the lack of price transparency.38 Worse, in the US litigation against Apple for 
example, it was clear that the way account users could accrue further charges following the 
download of a ‘seemingly free’ app was not transparent to users.39 In this case, parents had 
downloaded game applications or allowed their children to do so by signing into their Apple 
account. A signature enabled purchases without the need to re-enter a password for a period of 
fifteen minutes. Unbeknown to parents and children, the app marketed as ‘free’ or only costing a 
nominal fee was subsequently enticing the purchase of game currency when playing on the app. 
Because of the lapse in identification, children were able to make purchases without the need for 
their parents to re-enter a password and thereby authorize a subsequent purchase. Similarly, 
‘Paidmium’ models under which an application is purchased and further updates or content are 
paid for at a later stage will also require clear disclosures not only at the point of first purchase 
but also for any subsequent ones. Indeed, Article 8 (2) DCR states that if a ‘distance contract to 
be concluded by electronic means places the consumer under an obligation to pay, the trader 
shall make the consumer aware in a clear and prominent manner, and directly before the 
consumer places his order, of the information provided for in points (a), (e), (o) and (p) of 
Article 6(1)’.  
Price transparency is important because under Article 6(6) DCR , if the trader has not complied 
with the information requirements on additional charges or other costs, the consumer shall not 
bear those charges or costs. Further, unless the consumer “explicitly acknowledges that the order 
implies an obligation to pay (…) [he] shall not be bound by the contract or order”. 40 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly therefore Apple and Google had both agreed to refund unintended charges 
incurred by children unbeknown to their parents.41 Further, Article 22 DCR on additional 
payments states that ‘before the consumer is bound by the contract or offer, the trader shall seek 
the express consent of the consumer to any extra payment in addition to the remuneration agreed 
upon for the trader’s main contractual obligation. If the trader has not obtained the consumer’s 
express consent but has inferred it by using default options which the consumer is required to 
reject in order to avoid the additional payment, the consumer shall be entitled to reimbursement 
of this payment.’ Though there may be some doubt as to what would be considered to be the 
trader’s ‘main contractual obligation’ and what would therefore count as an additional charge in 
the app context,42 the particular provision certainly joins forces with other provisions, in 
particular Articles 6(1) and 8(2) requiring app platforms and app sellers to ensure that any in-app 
purchases, and their costs, are clearly flagged up and to obtain express consent from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Screenshots	  on	  file	  with	  the	  authors.	  Consulted	  23	  April	  2015.	  	  
38	  See	  below	  at	  p.	  
39	  Re	  Apple	  In-­‐app	  purchase	  litigation,	  Northern	  District	  of	  California,	  San	  Jose	  Division,	  Case	  No.	  5:11-­‐CV-­‐1758	  EJD.	  
40	  Article	  8(2)	  DCR.	  In	  addition,	  note	  that	  according	  to	  Article	  8(7),	  the	  trader	  also	  must	  provide	  confirmation	  of	  the	  
conclusion	  of	  the	  contract	  on	  a	  durable	  medium.	  This	  may	  include	  for	  apps	  purchases	  on	  a	  mobile	  phone,	  an	  email	  
or	  a	  free	  text	  message.	  	  
41	  See	  below	  at	  p.	  
42	  Each	  in	  app-­‐purchase	  for	  example	  probably	  constitutes	  a	  separate	  contract	  with	  delivery	  of	  the	  in-­‐app	  product	  
constituting	  the	  trader’s	  main	  contractual	  obligation.	  
consumer for extra charges or risk losing any payment collected.43 
Express consent is not defined by the Directive, and causes some concern. Article 27 DCR on 
inertia selling, explains that the consumer shall be exempted from the obligation to provide any 
consideration in cases of unsolicited supply of goods, water, gas, electricity, district heating or 
digital content or unsolicited provision of services, prohibited by Article 5(5) and point 29 of 
Annex I to Directive 2005/29/EC. In such cases, the absence of a response from the consumer 
following such an unsolicited supply or provision shall not constitute consent.’ As a result, 
absence of response is not consent. Express consent therefore seems necessarily to involve a 
positive action, something that also arises from Article 22. The latter expressly declares that 
implied consent that is inferred from pre-checked boxes for example, that the consumer needs to 
reject to avoid the charge, does not constitute valid consent for the purposes of the provision. It 
would follow that signing in with a password to authorize each purchase on Apple App store can 
be equated to express (and valid) consent. A signature that is only required every 15 minutes 
does not seem to fulfill this requirement and it may also constitute an unfair commercial practice 
violating the UCPD.44  
2.1.3 Information specific to digital content 
A survey of businesses revealed that the industry already pays attention to the more advanced 
and technological aspects of consumer information for digital products, i.e. functionality, 
interoperability and option for in-app purchases. Those information items are specific to digital 
products. 45  Our own anecdotal research on this aspect found that interoperability and 
functionality were by and large present on the description of the apps consulted on both Apple 
App Store and Google Play. Article 6(1)(r) DCR states that where applicable, the functionality, 
including applicable technical protection measures, of digital content needs to be disclosed to 
consumers. This may be useful information if for example the use of an app is limited to a 
number of devices. But Recital 19 clarifies that “The notion of functionality should refer to the 
ways in which digital content can be used, for instance for the tracking of consumer behavior 
(…)”.46	  The way apps collect personal data, often without user’s consent, is a heated topic 
troubling commentators47 and enforcers alike. By virtue of Article 6(1)(r), the consumer should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  DG	  Justice	  Guidance	  Document	  concerning	  Directive	  2011/83/EU	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  
of	  25	  October	  2011	  on	  consumer	  rights,	  amending	  Council	  Directive	  93/13/EEC	  and	  Directive	  1999/44/EC	  of	  the	  
European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  repealing	  Council	  Directive	  85/577/EEC	  and	  Directive	  97/7/EC	  of	  the	  
European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council,	  European	  Commission,	  DG	  Justice	  (June,	  2014),	  available	  at	  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-­‐marketing/files/crd_guidance_en.pdf.	  
44	  See	  below	  at	  p.	  
45	  Consumer	  information	  in	  the	  digital	  online	  market	  -­‐	  a	  behavioral	  approach,	  European	  Parliament	  (2011),	  
available	  at	  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201108/20110825ATT25258/20110825ATT25258EN.pd
f.	  The	  survey	  concerned	  businesses	  dealing	  in	  computer	  software,	   mobile	  and	  tablet	  applications,	   in-­‐app	  
purchasing	  inside	  another	  software	  or	  application	  and	  online	  products	  useable	  on	  a	  website	  without	  installation	  of	  
software.	  	  
46	  Emphasis	  added.	  
47	  Jennifer	  Betts	  et	  al.,	  Same	  Issues,	  New	  Devices:	  Is	  Smartphone	  App	  Privacy	  Groundhog	  Day	  for	  Regulators?	  (June	  
4,	  2013),	  available	  at	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2351189;	  Cheung	  ASY,	  Location	  Privacy:	  
The	  challenges	  of	  mobile	  service	  devices,	  Computer	  Law	  &	  Security	  Review	  Vol.	  30	  No.1	  (2014),	  available	  at	  
http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/194700/1/Content.pdf?accept=1;	  	  Timothy	  J.	  Van	  Hal,	  Taming	  the	  Golden	  
clearly be made aware of any privacy-sensitive feature beforehand or risk falling short of the 
requirements of the DCR but also fail to comply with the UCDP as we will explore shortly.  
In addition, Article 6(1)(s) also requires information on any relevant interoperability of digital 
content with hardware and software that the trader is aware of, or can reasonably be expected to 
have been aware of. The reason for this requirement is that it is important for the consumer to be 
aware of technical incompatibilities. By and large, the way the app market has organized itself 
reduces any interoperability issues, although it may create competition issues. Google Play is 
mostly servicing Android platforms and the Apple App Store is the primary source for iphones, 
ipads and other handheld and wrist-held devices of the same brand. However, problems may 
subsist because the language adopted to describe interoperability may be of little use for certain 
categories of consumers who are not particularly tech savvy.  
2.2 Right of withdrawal and information in the context of app purchases  
 
The aim of a right to withdraw is to ‘put the consumer in a position which makes it more likely 
that his consent will be free, well considered and informed’48 in situations where the consumer is 
faced with information asymmetry. In the context of app purchases, there are a few points at 
which withdrawal may need to be available: the point at which an app is purchased and the 
points at which in-app content or a subscription to the app is purchased. Under Article 6(1) a 
number of pieces of information regarding the right to withdraw need to be communicated to the 
consumers prior to the initial purchase.49  
 
Regarding digital content not supplied on a tangible medium, Article 16 (m) normally bars 
withdrawal, providing that the performance has begun with the consumer’s prior express consent 
and his acknowledgment that he thereby loses his right of withdrawal. Article 6(1)(k) requires 
that the consumer receive the information that he/she will ‘not benefit from a right of withdrawal 
or, where applicable, the circumstances under which the consumer loses his right of withdrawal.’ 
The art is therefore in informing the consumer in such a way that express consent and 
acknowledgement that the right of withdrawal is lost, is collected by the supplier. Express 
consent, we have seen is not defined. Another requirement here is to seek acknowledgment from 
the consumer that he/ she losses the right to withdraw. Presumably this can be done at the point 
of purchase for paid apps and for freemium apps at the point where the consumer contracts for 
the purchase of additional features.  
 
The issue however is not as straight-forward as one may think. Some apps (often free) enable the 
purchase of in-game tokens or currency or any other gimmicks. Others sell membership 
packages. It is unclear if such in-app purchases and/or memberships are service contracts or 
would qualify as digital content. For service contracts, a right to withdraw exists and is only lost 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Goose:	  Private	  Companies,	  Consumer	  Geolocation	  Data,	  and	  the	  Need	  for	  a	  Class	  Action	  Regime	  for	  Privacy	  
Protection,	  15	  Vanderbilt	  Journal	  of	  Entertainment	  &	  Technology	  713	  (2013),	  available	  at	  
http://www.jetlaw.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2013/03/VanHal.pdf.	  	  	  
48	  Peter	   Rott	   &	   Evelyne	   Terryn,	   Right	   of	  withdrawal	   and	   standard	   terms,	   in	   Hans-­‐W	  Micklitz	   et	   al.	   (eds),	   Cases,	  
Materials	  and	  Text	  on	  Consumer	  Law	  (2010).	  	  
49	  Article	  6(1)	  (h)	  to	  (k)	  DCR.  
after service provision has been completed.50 The distinction is therefore important.  
Under Article 9(2)(a) DCR, the 14-day period runs from the day of the conclusion of the contract 
for service contracts. Article 9(3) explains that the parties will be able to perform their 
contractual obligations during this period and payment can also be collected for the service.51 
However, to proceed in those contracts, the consumer will need to give his prior express consent, 
together with the acknowledgement that he will lose his right of withdrawal once the contract has 
been fully performed.52 Article 2(6) defines service contracts as ‘any contract other than a sales 
contract under which the trader supplies or undertakes to supply a service to the consumer and 
the consumer pays or undertakes to pay the price thereof’.53 Recital 50 states that a consumer 
should always benefit from the right to withdraw, even in cases where he has asked for the 
provision of services before the end of the withdrawal period. Under Article 16(a) DCR the 
consumer loses his right to withdraw if the service has been fully performed, but only if the 
performance had begun with the ‘consumer’s prior express consent and with the 
acknowledgment that he will lose the right of withdrawal once the contract has been fully 
performed by the trader’. When the consumer exercises his right of withdrawal, the DCR enables 
the trader to recover a proportionate amount calculated on the basis of the price agreed between 
the parties.54 For monthly membership this may be that a full month’s notice is due after which 
the right to withdraw kicks in. By contrast, if the membership is considered digital content, once 
the app is downloaded, the consumer loses any right to withdraw and may well be locked in that 
membership, unless the information was not adequately provided or the consumer did not gives 
its express consent and acknowledged the loss of the right to withdraw.  
Further, in particular cases, the consumer shall bear no cost for performance of a service or 
supply of digital content under Article 14 DCR. The way in which the consumer avoids costs, 
however, does vary depending on the classification of the contract. Article 14(4)(a) DCR 
indicates that the consumer shall bear no cost for the performance of services in full or in part, 
during the withdrawal period where (i) the trader failed to provide information in accordance 
with points (h) or (j) of Article 6(1) [namely concerning the conditions, time limits and 
procedure for exercising the right to withdraw as well as the fact that the consumer will be 
required to pay reasonable costs to withdraw if he made an express request for the performance 
of the service to begin during the withdrawal period]; or (ii) the consumer has not expressly 
requested performance to begin during the withdrawal period. This is unless the consumer can 
demonstrate that the total price is in itself disproportionate, in which case, the amount to be paid 
is calculated on the basis of market value according to Recital 50 DCR. The conditions are 
different when it comes to avoiding paying costs for digital purchases. Under Article 14(4)(b) 
DCR: ‘The consumer shall bear no cost for: … (b) the supply, in full or in part, of digital content 
which is not supplied on a tangible medium where:(i) the consumer has not given his prior 
express consent to the beginning of the performance before the end of the 14-day period (…); (ii) 
the consumer has not acknowledged that he loses his right of withdrawal when giving his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Article	  16(a),	  DCR.	  
51	  This	  rule	  is	  an	  extension	  of	  Article	  6(3)	  DSD	  which	  barred	  withdrawal	  for	  services	  if	  performance	  had	  begun,	  with	  
the	  consumer’s	  agreement,	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  seven-­‐day	  period.	  
52	  Article	  16(a)	  DCR	  on	  exemptions	  from	  the	  right	  of	  withdrawal.	  
53	  Article	  2(6)	  DCR.	  
54	  Article	  14(3)	  DCR.  
consent; or (iii) the trader has failed to provide confirmation in accordance with (…) Article 8(7) 
[namely confirmation on a durable medium of the required information as well as confirmation 
of the consumer’s prior express consent and acknowledgement].  
What seems more appropriate, to better protect consumers is to consider in-app purchases as well 
as memberships as a service contract. The advantage is that the consumer will be free to 
withdraw at any stage, even if some in-game currency or in-app purchase had been partly used. 
However, this is an interpretation that has not yet been tested in court and regarding which much 
uncertainty exist.55  
 
3. Applying the UCPD in the app world 
 
Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD)56 prohibits any unfair 
commercial practices. Commercial practices are defined as “(…) any act, omission, course of 
conduct or representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a 
trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers”.57 The 
Directive includes a black list of thirty-one commercial practices (contained in the Annex) that 
are unfair and prohibited under all circumstances. It also defines three categories of practices that 
are subject to a ‘fairness’ test. Those include unfair commercial practices that mislead consumers 
either by action58 or omission.59 The Directive also prohibits aggressive practices.60 Those 
practices are unfair if they are restricting user freedom of choice through coercion, harassment or 
undue influence and result or are likely to result in a consumer making a transactional decision 
he would not have otherwise taken.61 Finally, a general fairness clause ensures that commercial 
practices that are neither misleading nor aggressive and are not included in the black list either, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  The	  Commission	  Guidance	  does	  not	  clear	  the	  uncertainty.	  Though	  it	  treats	  subscriptions	  to	  online	  services	  such	  
as	  online	  newspapers	  as	  service	  contracts,	  it	  seems	  to	  regard	  app-­‐related	  subscriptions	  and	  purchases	  included	  as	  
a	  built-­‐in	  feature	  of	  other	  digital	  content	  such	  as	  apps	  as	  contracts	  for	  digital	  content,	  see	  European	  Commission,	  
supra	  n.43	  at	  pp.6-­‐7,	  64-­‐65.	  However,	  at	  least	  in	  relation	  to	  purchases	  of	  in-­‐game	  currency,	  that	  would	  not	  seem	  to	  
be	   a	   correct	   approach.	   See	   also	   Christiana	  Markou,	  Online	   penny	   auctions	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   consumer	  
under	   EU	   law,	   Computer	   Law	   &	   Security	   Review	   Vol.	   30	   No.	   5	   (October,	   2014),	   available	   at	  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364914001290.	  	  
56	  Directive	  2005/29/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  11	  May	  2005	  concerning	  unfair	  business-­‐
to-­‐consumer	  commercial	  practices	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  amending	  Council	  Directive	  84/450/EEC,	  Directives	  
97/7/EC,	  98/27/EC	  and	  2002/65/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  
2006/2004	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  (‘Unfair	  Commercial	  Practices	  Directive’)	  O.J.	  L	  149/22	  
(2005).	  
57	  Article	  2(d),	  UCPD.	  
58	  Article	  6,	  UCPD.	  (false	  or	  inaccurate	  information)	  
59	  Article	  7,	  UCPD.	  (non-­‐provision	  of	  information	  that	  the	  consumer	  needs	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  
60	  Articles	  5(1)	  and	  5(4)(b),	  UCPD.	  	  
61	  Article	  8,	  UCPD.	  
can still be deemed unfair if they are contrary to professional diligence and are likely to result in 
a consumer decision that would not otherwise have taken.62  
To fall within the scope of the UCPD, a ‘transactional decision’ is therefore required. A 
transactional decision is, amongst others, a decision to purchase or make payment.63 The 
European Commission and the UK OFT favours a broad interpretation and therefore “(…) A 
commercial practice may be considered unfair not only if it is likely to cause the average 
consumer to purchase or not to purchase a product but also if it is likely to cause the consumer to 
enter a shop (…).” 64  Therefore, the commercial practices discussed (chiefly advertising) 
performed within an app and aimed at convincing consumers to purchase an in-app product can 
lead to a transactional decision, thereby satisfying the relevant requirement. By the same token, 
the same is true even where the commercial practice aims at ‘pushing’ consumers to use a free 
app, which does not (initially) involve any purchase or payment as it seems akin to consumers 
entering a shop. 
There are three main situations where fairness is questionable in the app world. They are linked 
to the type of advertising the app developer or app-providing platform engages with. We will 
review issues of fairness linked with (i) the use of apps as third party advertising media, (ii) apps 
as products themselves and thus, as the subject matter of advertising, and (iii) apps as advertising 
media for their own in-app products. 
3.1 Apps as a third party advertising media 
On websites, network advertising agencies often provide adverts paid by interested advertisers. 
Apps can serve as such ‘advertising-homes’ too. Much of this advertising is behavioural 
advertising. It raises many objections and legal issues mainly relating to privacy, thus engaging 
data protection and privacy legislation.65 To a lesser extent, it also raises consumer protection 
issues, falling under both the ECD66 and the UCPD.67 Those are not new issues, and they have 
been aptly explored elsewhere68 However, while this chapter will not revisit behavioural 
advertising as a topic, it points to certain characteristics of the app environment that increase the 
risks faced by consumers subject to such advertising. App-based behavioural advertising 
essentially emulates network advertising on the web. This activity is led by organizations such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Article	  5(2),	  UCPD.	  
63	  See	  supra	  at	  p.	  
64	  European	  Commission,	  The	  meaning	  of	  transactional	  decision,	  
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/ucp/public/index.cfm?event=public.guidance.showArticle&elemID=14	  (last	  visited	  
April	  17,	  2015).	  
65	  In	  particular,	  the	  95/46/EC	  Data	  protection	  Directive	  and	  the	  2002/58/EC	  e-­‐Privacy	  Directive.	  
66	  Article	  6	  ECD.	  
67	  The	  argument	  implicating	  the	  UCPD	  revolves	  around	  whether	  a	  failure	  to	  disclose	  the	  behavioural	  nature	  of	  the	  
advert	  can	  cause	  a	  consumer	  transactional	  decision	  that	  would	  not	  otherwise	  have	  taken,	  thus	  constituting	  a	  
misleading	  omission	  under	  Article	  7(1)	  UCPD,	  see	  below	  at	  p.	  
68	  See	  for	  example,	  Christine	  Riefa	  &	  Christiana	  Markou,	  Online	  Marketing:	  Advertisers	  Know	  You	  are	  a	  Dog	  on	  the	  
Internet,	  in	  Savin	  Andrej	  &	  Trzaskowski	  Jan	  (eds.),	  Research	  handbook	  on	  EU	  Internet	  Law	  (2014)	  pp.398-­‐401.	  
RevMob69 and of course, Google which has developed app-specific advertising solutions such as 
AdMob to respond to and monetize this new advertising medium.70  Because of app-based 
behavioural advertising, apps seemingly know that you are a user from a particular country,  
know what your personal preferences may be, and much more. Google admits to be serving 
‘interest based ads’ on apps belonging to the Google Display Network selected on the basis of 
information such as user browsing habits and app usage activity.71   
3.1.1The impact of apps’ technological characteristics on the effectiveness (and dangers) of 
behavioural advertising  
The size of the screens of smart phones and tablets is a first aggravating factors concerning the 
impact of behavioural advertising in apps. Unlike the web, which is still very often accessed 
through personal computers with a screen of 11 to 17 inches (or larger), apps have to be accessed 
through mobile devices having a (much) smaller screen. As a result, the impact of adverts is 
much greater than during web browsing. Behavioural adverts can be missed while browsing a 
web page because they intermingle with other web content that claims the user’s attention. By 
contrast, in an app, they are given a central place because they are bound to occupy a 
significantly larger part of the devices’ display. Especially when a smart phone is used, the 
behavioural advert takes the full width of the screen and the user can only view other content if 
she scrolls up or down to the advert. In this respect, app-related behavioural advertising can be 
much more effective than its web-based counterpart. Consequently, the individual autonomy of 
the consumer is more at risk than it was in a web setting.72  
In addition to monopolizing attention, app-based behavioural adverts can also be served to users 
even when they are offline, unlike web-based ads, which are only shown and seen when the user 
is connected to the Internet. The fact that the ad can be seen without an internet connection being 
available creates problems, because the user seeing the ad will be unable to use the ‘i’ icon73 if it 
is available, and receive information about the commercial nature of this advert. Article 6 ECD 
requires that online advertising is clearly identifiable as such and Article 7(2) requires disclosure 
of the commercial intent of the commercial practice.74 Compliance with these requirements is 
particularly important in the app context, where adverts may not always be readily 
distinguishable from app content. Further, if the non-disclosure of the behavioural nature of the 
advert is likely to affect consumer decision-making, the non-functional ‘i’ icon may also engage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  See	  REVMOB,	  https://www.revmobmobileadnetwork.com/	  (last	  visited	  April	  17,	  2015).	  
70	  Mobile	  Ads,	  Think	  with	  Google,	  https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/products/mobile-­‐ads.html	  (last	  visited	  April,	  
2015);	  Monetize	  your	  apps	  intelligently,	  AdMob,	  	  https://www.google.com/admob/index.html	  (last	  visited	  April	  
2015).	  
71	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  clicking	  on	  the	  ‘i’	  icon	  that	  is	  attached	  on	  each	  advert.	  For	  more	  on	  this	  icon,	  see	  below	  at	  p.	  
72	  Riefa	  and	  Markou,	  supra	  n.68.	  
73	  This	  is	  because	  the	  ‘i’	  icon	  typically	  leads	  users	  to	  a	  web	  page	  containing	  the	  relevant	  information	  which	  requires	  
an	  Internet	  connection	  to	  work.	  
74	  On	  this	  provision,	  see	  also	  below	  at	  p.	  
Article 7(1) UCPD on misleading omissions.75 The fact that the advert is seen more prominently 
on a mobile device may increase the likelihood of a practice affecting the way the consumer 
makes a decision, as the consumer cannot avoid or ignore it. The use of the ‘i’ icon to inform 
consumers was the result of a self-regulatory initiative taken in response to concerns expressed in 
relation to behavioural advertising. It can be an efficient method of compliance with the law, but 
only if it is fully functional.76 Thus, unless app-developers make sure that offline cached adverts 
are accompanied by relevant information, which is similarly accessible offline, such behavioural 
adverts can potentially  fall foul of the EU legislation currently in place. 
The dangers of the ‘gamification’ of apps for children and other target groups  
Another issue concerns the fact that the line between content addressed to adults and content that 
is addressed (or may be appealing) to children is much less bright in the app environment than it 
is on the web. Apps are accessed through mobile devices that invariably incorporate touch screen 
technology. Touch screens and the way they respond to mere touches are likely to appeal to 
children more than keyboards and mouse clicks. Indeed, research suggests that “children’s initial 
reaction to touch screen devices is characterized by fascination and immediate engagement 
(…)”.77 “Touch screen technology and accompanying digital Apps offer an accessible and 
meaningful media platform for children as young as two years of age”.78 Websites now go 
mobile, thereby becoming accessible via touch screens too. Yet experts confirm that when it 
comes to interactivity with users, apps score much higher than the mobile web.79 This high level 
of interactivity is bound to appeal to children who naturally tend to be discouraged by the need to 
put effort on tasks and are more likely to get excited with the effortless and lively reactions of 
apps. Moreover, unlike mobile websites, which can only be accessed after the relevant URL is 
typed in the address bar of the browser, apps stored on a mobile device are readily accessible 
through a touch on the colourful and child-friendly app icons. In addition, there is a danger that 
game apps in particular are likely to appeal to children even when they are not addressed to them. 
The ease of access, high interactivity, bright and colourful graphics, the ‘smart’ sounds and more 
generally, the playful appearance that even games addressed to grown-ups often have are likely 
to be attractive to children. As Chester puts it, there are apps that “look child-friendly but are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Online	  Targeting	  of	  Advertising	  and	  Prices,	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  62	  (May,	  2011)	  available	  at	  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/
659703/OFT1231.pdf.	  	  	  
76	  For	  more	  on	  the	  issue,	  see	  Christine	  Riefa	  &	  Christiana	  Markou,	  supra	  n.68	  at	  p.409.	  
77	  Michael	  Cohen	  Group	  LLC,	  Young	  Children,	  Apps	  &	  iPad	  (2012)	  available	  at	  http://mcgrc.com/wp-­‐
content/uploads/2012/06/ipad-­‐study-­‐cover-­‐page-­‐report-­‐mcg-­‐info_new-­‐online.pdf.	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  Jason	  Summerfield,	  Mobile	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  vs.	  Mobile	  Apps	  (Application):	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  is	  Best	  for	  Your	  Organization?,	  
http://www.hswsolutions.com/services/mobile-­‐web-­‐development/mobile-­‐website-­‐vs-­‐apps/	  (last	  visited	  April	  17,	  
2015).	  
actually anything but”80 or “are far more adult-like than they appear”.81 Even non-game apps can 
have a playful appearance or features. Indeed, ‘gamification’ is an acknowledged technique for 
improving user interaction and loyalty and successfully pursuing commercial goals for all type of 
apps even business ones.82 A list of examples of gamification includes websites that would never 
be thought to be child-friendly and include the US army app.83  
As a result, serving the appropriate targeted advert in apps is a challenging task that may not 
always be performed successfully. The Guardian uncovered that some adverts promoting cash 
loans were appearing on Talking Friends apps.84 Those are primarily addressed to children. The 
featured advertiser did not know this had been the case and immediately agreed that its adverts 
should not appear within apps addressed to persons below the age of 18 when alerted. 
Behavioural advertising is not equivalent to contextual advertising because the content of the 
advert is not decided merely by reference to the context within which the adverts appear but on 
the interests, prior activity and other apps on the mobile device of the user. Thus, an app-network 
advertising system will serve adverts relevant to the variety of interests of the main user (and 
most probably) owner of the mobile device even, when it is his child who uses the device. In 
effect, not just loans but also dating, gambling and even adult content can be advertised to that 
child, something which is not merely morally wrong but may also entail serious legal issues as 
the advertising of gambling to children for example, is often a criminal offence.85 What is more, 
the standard by which the fairness and hence, legal acceptability of any advert (even one of non-
controversial subject-matter) is assessed under the UCPD is stricter when the advert is addressed 
or can be received by children.86  
Admittedly, the same issues apply also in the context of web-based behavioural advertising: the 
advertising system does not know if it is a child that browses the internet at a given time. Yet, 
given the special characteristics of apps just explained, it seems much more difficult to ensure a 
law-abiding advertising system in the app-based environment. The exclusion of controversial 
adverts or total exclusion of adverts on game apps appear too drastic in a domain which is 
primarily financed through advertising and in any event, the relevant solutions could not furnish 
advertisers and/or network advertising agencies with a fully effective shield against the 
possibility of inappropriately dealing with children and facing legal sanctions. Indeed, recall that 
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  News.co.au,	  May	  19,	  2103,	  
http://www.news.com.au/technology/home-­‐entertainment/parents-­‐warned-­‐smash-­‐dude-­‐app-­‐one-­‐of-­‐many-­‐
unsuitable-­‐apps-­‐available-­‐to-­‐children/story-­‐fn81y8rt-­‐1226645800352	  (last	  visited	  April	  17,	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  April	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  2014,	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  visited	  April	  17,	  2015).	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  Robert	  Stanley,	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  Best	  Examples	  of	  Gamification	  in	  Business,	  Clickipedia,	  March	  24,	  2014,	  
http://blogs.clicksoftware.com/clickipedia/top-­‐25-­‐best-­‐examples-­‐of-­‐gamification-­‐in-­‐business/	  (last	  visited	  April	  
2015).	  	  
84	  The	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  talking	  friends	  shop,	  http://talkingfriends.com/	  (last	  visited	  April	  17,	  2015).	  	  
85	  See	  for	  example,	  Section	  46	  of	  UK	  Gambling	  Act	  2005.	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  more	  on	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  issue,	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  at	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apps not intended for children may, due to “gamification”, appeal to them. The app provider, 
who knows his app best, ought to filter the adverts to be shown within its app, using relevant 
filtering tools, some of which are often provided by app-based advertising providers.87 Of course, 
to be able to perform such filtering effectively, app providers would need some guidance 
regarding the practical ramifications of the UCPD’s fairness test. In this respect the Principles 
developed by the UK OFT88 and other similar initiatives that we will explore shortly can prove 
very useful.  
3.2 Apps as a product and subject-matter of advertising  
Primarily apps are consumer products. An important challenge for app developers and/or 
providers is to ensure that their app finds its way onto consumers’ devices. Understandably, no 
matter how an app intends to generate revenue, be it from behavioural advertising, a download 
fee or in-app purchases, it will not succeed if users are not convinced to download it in the first 
place. Advertising and promoting the app seems therefore a prerequisite to its success. In this 
context, the advertising medium for the app is primarily the app-providing platform, such as the 
App Store or Google Play. On those platforms, consumers can search for apps, read about the 
ones they are interested in and decide whether to hit download.  
3.2.1 Curbing the excesses of ‘freemium’ models  
Much controversy surrounds free apps that are in fact simply a platform for in-app purchases, the 
cost of which is not always transparent to users.89 More worryingly, apps may also collect 
personal data and construct individual profiles that will be monetized by serving behavioural 
adverts or by being sold to third parties. Studies conducted by data protection authorities and 
privacy watchdogs in Europe (and beyond) have shown that most apps collect a striking amount 
of user personal data while only a small fraction of them offers users clear and comprehensive 
information about the relevant data collection and usage prior to such data being communicated 
by the user.90 The French Data Protection Authority speaks of “massive amounts of points of 
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  April	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  find	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  Apps,	  	   InfoWorld,	  Sep.	  
12,	   2014,	   http://www.infoworld.com/article/2682555/internet-­‐privacy/data-­‐protection-­‐authorities-­‐find-­‐privacy-­‐
lapses-­‐in-­‐majority-­‐of-­‐mobile-­‐apps.html	  (last	  visited	  April	  17,	  2015),	  Results	  of	  the	  2014	  Global	  Privacy	  Enforcement	  
Network	   Sweep,	  Office	   of	   the	   Privac	   Commissioner	   of	   Canada,	   Sep.	   10,	   2014,	   https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-­‐
c/2014/bg_140910_e.asp	  (last	  visited	  April	  17,	  2015),	  Results	  of	  the	  2014	  GPEN	  Privacy	  Sweep,	  Global	  Trends	  and	  
Examples,	  available	  at	  https://www.dataprotection.ie/docimages/GPEN_Summary_Global_Results_2014.pdf.	  
access to personal data that are invisible to users”91 and of the “app in exchange of personal data” 
deal not being “made out in the open”.92  
Alternatively, the supposedly free app may be only partially free. For example, the consumer 
may have to pay to ‘unlock’ most of the stages of a game or must perform certain in-app 
purchases, thereby acquiring certain tools or content, which are vital to the consumer being able 
to enjoy or successfully play/complete the game or simply use the app. This freemium model is 
unsurprisingly very popular in the app world, most probably because it greatly assists app 
developers in overcoming the very first hurdle of getting onto the device of the consumer. Yet 
this model has its detractors because “the goal is instead to create a game that’s compelling 
initially but frustratingly slow and obstacle-strewn later on, so that player is encouraged to spend 
real-world cash to skip ahead. Balance, a finely graded difficulty curve, a pleasurable and 
satisfying user experience – none of this is considered at all”.93 
As much as one can understand the need for app developers to devise ways in which their app 
can produce revenue, the freemium model is liable to disappointing consumers. Those who have 
downloaded an app may eventually see their expectation of a free game frustrated. Under such 
circumstances, the initial consumer decision to download would have been different had the 
consumer known of the need to pay in order to enjoy the game. Indeed, Torres explains that the 
freemium system is creating “a bad reputation around games offering in-app purchases, with 
non-paying users leaving the game as soon as they noticed it’s not really free”.94 Of course, there 
may be ways in which freemium apps can offer enough free features to keep non-paying users 
content, while making available to paying users “certain advantages assisting them in 
winning.”95 In any case, the user must be sufficiently informed in advance so that he knows the 
basic characteristics of the app he/she is about to download and the real (and full) cost of the app. 
This is because, under Article 7(5) UCPD, not disclosing the information required under the 
DCR96 amounts to an unfair omission for it is a failure to disclose material information that a 
consumer needs. It may also constitute an unfair commercial practice pursuant to other 
provisions of the UCPD as we will now explain. 
3.2.2 Free means free 
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  Work,	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  May,	  2014,	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In December 2013, national consumer protection authorities97 adopted a common legal position98 
identifying, as a first issue associated with app promotion, the misleading use of the word free.99 
The common position explained, “the use of the word "free" (or similar unequivocal terms) as 
such, and without any appropriate qualifications, should only be allowed for games which are 
indeed free in their entirety, or in other words which contain no possibility of making in-app 
purchases, not even on an optional basis”.100 The common position points to paragraph 20 of the 
black list of the UCPD. Under this paragraph, “describing a product as ‘gratis’, ‘free’, ‘without 
charge’ or similar if the consumer has to pay anything other than the unavoidable cost of 
responding to the commercial practice and collecting or paying for delivery of the item” is unfair 
under all circumstances and thus a prohibited commercial practice. This practice could also be 
considered unfair under Article 6(1)(b), which refers to false or inaccurate information on the 
main characteristics of the product and Article 6(1)(d) and Article 7(4)(c) UCPD, which refer to 
price or the manner in which it is calculated.  
The OFT developed a set of Principles for online and app-based games clarifying “the OFT’s 
view of the online and app-based games industry’s obligations under consumer protection 
law”.101 The very first Principle refers to pricing. According to the OFT, the costs of the app 
should specify not only the initial cost of downloading the game, if any but also “any subsequent 
costs that are unavoidable if the consumer wishes to continue playing the game” as well as 
“optional extra costs, including in-game purchases”.102 Interestingly, the common legal position 
was communicated to Apple and Google. They have both proposed to change their relevant 
practices to align them with the law. It seems that the relevant national authorities have 
expressed some reservations with the proposal of Apple to add the text ‘in-app’ purchases next to 
the word ‘free’ repeating that the particular term is only permissible where in-app purchases are 
purely optional.103 They appeared much more content with Google’s practice that removed the 
word ‘free’ in relation to apps that contain in-app purchases and its willingness to display the 
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  Apple,	  
Google	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  trade	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  regarding	  in-­‐app	  purchases	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  online	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price range (from minimum to maximum) of all the in-app purchases offered by a game app.104 
According to them, these said practices would comply with the UCPD and also the DCR.105 
3.2.3 Controlling the monetization of personal data collected by apps  
The financing of a free-to-download app through the collection of user personal data, though 
primarily being considered a ‘privacy’ issue,106 may also give rise to the use of the UCPD. More 
specifically, according to Article 7(2) UCPD, it may be a misleading omission and therefore, an 
unfair commercial practice if there is a failure “to identify the commercial intent of the 
commercial practice if not already apparent from the context (…).” Referring to the 
corresponding provision in the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations,107 namely 
Regulation 6(1)(d), the OFT expressed the opinion that “that provision may be relevant where a 
consumer’s personal data are obtained by a business, for example, for marketing or research 
purposes, but this commercial intent is not clearly disclosed to the consumer”.108 When a game 
can be downloaded and played without the user having to incur any cost, the commercial intent 
hidden in the clandestine personal data collection cannot be considered ‘apparent from the 
context’ and should, thus, clearly be stated to users.  
More generally, according to Article 7(1) UCPD, it is a misleading omission to omit material 
information that the consumer may need to form a decision. According to the OFT, ‘material 
information’ is likely to include whether the game includes advertising either of the trader’s own 
or of those of third parties.109 Information of this kind is often provided within the privacy policy 
of the app or the terms and conditions. However, those are often long and technical and it is 
therefore questionable whether the relevant practice would pass the hurdle of Article 7(2) UCPD, 
according to which it is a misleading omission if material information is hidden or provided “in 
an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner”.  
3.3 Apps as advertising mediums for their own in-app products 
Some of the practices employed by ‘Freemium’ app developers and/or providers are 
objectionable. In the US, Google and Apple had to refund millions of dollars spent by children 
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on in-app purchases, due to the fact that completing transactions was “too easy”.110 Consent to 
in-app payments is essentially a contractual issue that attracts the application of the DCR, but 
failure to provide adequate information and using techniques ‘vitiating’ the consumer’s consent 
also fall under the remit of the UCPD. Further, in-app advertising to children is also of great 
concern	  under the prism of the UCPD and it seems that the same is true of US consumer laws.111  
In-app payments need to be expressly authorized by the consumer 
Apple and Google112 were storing passwords for 15 and 30 minutes respectively following the 
making of an in-app purchase. That meant that during this time in-app purchases could be made 
very easily without any need for a password.113 The 2013 common position, adopted by national 
consumer protection authorities114 states that this practice may constitute an unfair commercial 
practice, specifically a misleading omission pursuant to Article 7(4)(d) of the UCPD. This 
provision requires that a commercial practice must state “the arrangements for payment (…) if 
they depart from the requirements of professional diligence”. Pursuant to Article 7(2)115 it must 
do so, clearly and in a timely manner.116 That would require that users have the choice to instruct 
the system to request a password for each and every purchase. Equally, the consumer ought to 
choose to have its password activated without the need for re-entry. This should never be a 
default setting as it used to be.117 The practice by which a password entered once opens a 
‘window” during which the consumer can make in-app purchases without having to revalidate is 
also against Principle 8 of the OFT and runs counter to the CDR as well. Indeed, Article 6(1)(g) 
DCR also requires that information on the arrangements for payment be provided to consumers 
before contract conclusion.118 The national consumer protection authorities participating in the 
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  Complaint	  It	  Unlawfully	  Billed	  Parents	  for	  Children’s	  
Unauthorized	  In-­‐App	  Charges,	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission,	  September	  4,	  2014,	  
https://www.ftc.gov/news-­‐events/press-­‐releases/2014/09/google-­‐refund-­‐consumers-­‐least-­‐19-­‐million-­‐settle-­‐ftc-­‐
complaint-­‐it	  (last	  visited	  April	  17,	  2015);	  Sam	  Frizell,	  Apple	  will	  Refund	  Parents	  whose	  Kids	  Splurged	  on	  Apps,	  
TimeBusiness,	  January	  15,	  2014,	  http://business.time.com/2014/01/15/apple-­‐will-­‐refund-­‐parents-­‐whose-­‐kids-­‐
splurged-­‐on-­‐apps/	  (last	  visited	  April	  17,	  2015);	  How	  to:	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  a	  Refund	  From	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  Play	  for	  In-­‐App	  Purchases	  Your	  
Kids	  Made	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  Your	  Permission,	  Richontech,	  December	  17,	  2014,	  
http://www.richdemuro.com/home/2014/12/17/how-­‐to-­‐get-­‐a-­‐refund-­‐from-­‐google-­‐play-­‐for-­‐in-­‐app-­‐purchases-­‐
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  (last	  visited	  April	  17,	  2015).	  There	  has	  also	  been	  a	  US	  class	  action	  filed	  
against	  Google	  in	  July	  2014,	  see	  Ilana	  Imber-­‐Gluck,	  On	  Behalf	  of	  Herself	  and	  all	  Others	  Similarly	  Situated	  v.	  	  Google,	  
Inc.,	  a	  Delaware	  Corporation,	  Case5:14-­‐cv-­‐01070-­‐PSG,	  https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1070126-­‐
class-­‐action-­‐against-­‐google-­‐over-­‐in-­‐app-­‐purchases.html	  (last	  visited	  April	  17,	  2015).	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  Federal	  Register	  Vol.	  79	  No.	  15	  (January	  23,	  2014),	  available	  at	  
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/federal_register_notices/2014/01/140123appleanalysisfrn.pdf.	  
112	  See	  common	  position,	  supra	  n.98.	  
113	  See	  also	  above	  at	  p.	  
114	  Supra	  n.112	  at	  pp.2-­‐3.	  
115	  See	  supra	  at	  p.	  
116	  Supra	  n.112	  at	  pp.2-­‐3.	  
117	  Supra	  n.112	  pp.2-­‐3	  and	  supra	  n.103	  at	  pp.2-­‐3,	  5.	  
118	  See	  supra	  at	  p.	  See	  also	  Annexe	   to	   the	  OFT’	   s	  Principles	   for	  online	  and	  app-­‐based	  games:	   relevant	   legislative	  
provisions,	   Office	   of	   Fair	   Trading	   1519a,	   available	   at	  
common position expressed regret that unlike Google, Apple had not committed to make any 
significant changes to its relevant settings,119 though in March 2014, the new apple software was 
displaying a relevant warning also offering users the possibility to remove the ‘purchase 
window’.120  
In-app purchases made by children  
The main issue with freemium models and games in particular is that they “(…) are highly 
addictive, designed deliberately so, and tend to compel children playing them to purchase large 
quantities of Game Currency, amounting to as much as $100 per purchase or more”.121 Aside 
from potential issues concerning the ability of children to enter into valid contracts, ‘addictive 
features’ raise the question of the fairness of the commercial practice. The UCPD addresses 
those issues quite powerfully. The relevant provisions have inspired the OFT’s Principles 4-7 
which refer to examples of practices that:  
(i) mislead consumers for example, by ‘blending’ paid in-app promotion together with gameplay 
or obscuring the option of acquiring the same benefit (eg. a life) by waiting, instead of paying 
and, 
(ii) are aggressive to children, for example by giving them the impression that the well-being of a 
game character relies on them122 or by expressly calling them to make a purchase, in particular 
through the use of words such as Buy More Now.123 
The OFT clarified, that misleading practices engage a number of provisions, namely, “Art 6 
(prohibition on unfair misleading actions), Art 5(4)(a) and 7 (prohibition on unfair misleading 
omissions) and in particular Art 7(2) (failure to identify commercial intent of commercial 
practice)”.124 According to Article 6(1) UCPD, a practice can be misleading if “(…) in any way, 
including overall presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer, even if the 
information is factually correct”.125 As a result, intermingling paid-app content promotion and 
game may be misleading even if no false information is provided. The information may be there 
and correct, but because it is not clear, it may result in misleading the consumer. A fortiori, a 
practice, which hides material information, is prohibited. This is for example the case in game 
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  the	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  it	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  measures	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  Supra	  n.103	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  Lance	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  CNET,	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  paragraph	  43.	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  of	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  that	  states	  the	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  supra	  n.33	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  p.13.	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  Supra	  n.33	  at	  pp.10-­‐16.	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  OFT,	  supra	  n.49	  at	  p.2.	  
125	  Emphasis	  added.	  
apps where the option to wait for a while instead of paying to continue play can amount to a 
misleading omission controlled by the operation of Article 7(2) UCPD.  
When children are the target of the commercial practice, the ‘fairness’ test of the UCPD is 
stricter in that whether a practice is likely to cause a consumer to take a transactional decision126  
should be judged by reference to the average child and not consumer in general. Article 5(3) 
expressly states that “Commercial practices which are likely to materially distort the economic 
behaviour only of a clearly identifiable group of consumers who are particularly vulnerable to 
the practice or the underlying product because of their mental or physical infirmity, age or 
credulity in a way which the trader could reasonably be expected to foresee, shall be assessed 
from the perspective of the average member of that group”. Recital 18 expressly refers to 
children as one such clearly identifiable group of consumers. As a result, (in-app) advertising 
may be considered misleading (and thus unfair) if it can mislead a child whom it is likely to 
reach, even if it could not mislead an adult. That is so, if the app developer could have foreseen 
its use by children. The same holds true of aggressive practices discussed below. The real 
problem for app developers is that, as already explained127 it is not always easy to distinguish 
between content that may be appealing to children and content that is highly unlikely to be used 
by them. 
A number of practices can be also considered aggressive and are prohibited. One such practice is 
described at Paragraph 28 of Annex I. This paragraph states that “including in an advertisement a 
direct exhortation to children to buy advertised products or persuade their parents or other adults 
to buy advertised products for them (…)” is, under all circumstances, unfair and thus, 
prohibited.128 Direct exhortations are thus prohibited out right.  
More generally, according to Article 8 UCPD, “A commercial practice shall be regarded as 
aggressive if (…) by harassment, coercion, including the use of physical force, or undue 
influence, it significantly impairs or is likely to significantly impair the average consumer's 
freedom of choice or conduct with regard to the product and thereby causes him or is likely to 
cause him to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise”. ‘Undue 
influence’ refers to “(…) exploiting a position of power in relation to the consumer so as to apply 
pressure, even without using or threatening to use physical force, in a way which significantly 
limits the consumer's ability to make an informed decision”.129 Representing a game character as 
suffering or being unhappy as in the example offered by the OFT130 would therefore seem to 
qualify as undue influence especially given that (young) children are inexperienced and/or naïve 
and are thus more vulnerable to pressure.  
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Another situation giving rise to unfair commercial practices includes “the exploitation by the 
trader of any specific misfortune or circumstance of such gravity as to impair the consumer's 
judgement, of which the trader is aware, to influence the consumer's decision with regard to the 
product” (Article 9(c) UCPD). Some experts believe that app gaming may class as an 
addiction.131 Game addiction could qualify as one such ‘specific circumstance’ especially given 
that addictions are scientifically recognized as impairing decision-making.132 However this is not 
an issue that has yet been decided by courts in the EU and much controversy still exists 
surrounding the notion of addiction and its impact.133 Nevertheless, if not addiction, at least some 
levels of “engineered compulsion”134 to make in-app purchases can be recognized, which does 
not make relevant game apps any less objectionable. As Miguel Sicart, the author of The Ethics 
of Computer Games explains, “when a game is designed to create a shallow but rewarding 
compulsion loop, and makes the player pay to stay in the zone where that compulsion is 
satisfying, then I think some problems arise, regardless of this activity being addiction or not”.135 
This, amongst others, refers to practices such as those used by games apps. When playing Candy 
Crush for example, users have to wait to get an additional life to continue the game if they are 
not willing to pay to acquire one. 
As it stands the UCPD offers a number of avenues to control practices that deceive or are likely 
to deceive children as well as other groups of consumers. It also lays down a general (unfairness) 
clause,136 which acts as a “safety net”137 catching those commercial practices that do not (clearly) 
fall within the scope of the provisions on misleading and aggressive practices or the black list of 
the Annex. Specifically, Article 5(2) deems unfair a commercial practice that is not in accord 
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  University	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PsychCentral,	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  (last	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  April	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with professional diligence and is likely to materially distort consumer economic behaviour. 
Professional diligence involves good faith and honest practice.138  It may be that ‘engineered 
compulsion’ for example, would fall foul of Article 5(2) even if it was to fail under other UCPD 
provisions. Of course, it remains to be seen how the general clause and the rest of the provisions 
of the UCPD are to be interpreted by the courts in the context of apps. However the intervention 
by public enforcement authorities in both sides of the Atlantic seems to indicate that the UCPD 
and other equivalent legislation are sufficiently clear to force compliance. 
 
Conclusion  
The world of apps creates a number of challenges for the legislator. In the context of contractual 
relationships formed with apps and in-apps, the DCR offers some protection. Primarily, it offers 
a right to be informed about a number of essential points, such as the contact details of the app 
provider, the main characteristics (including technical ones) of the product (the app or the in-app 
purchase) and most importantly the price. However, we have seen that because the DCR was not 
designed with apps in mind, but simply geared towards controlling the sale of digital content 
online, some elements of protection cause problems. The classification of apps as services 
contracts or digital content is particularly difficult and yet crucial to giving consumers a right to 
withdraw from their purchases or barring them from it.   
By contrast, the application of the UCPD, seems more straightforward and national enforcers 
have already noted its relevance in the app context. However, here again interpreting the 
legislation in light of the app world has posed a few challenges. Behavioural advertising is 
problematic in all settings, but the technical limitations of the devices on which apps are used 
tend to render unfairness more acute. Indeed, the smaller display of mobile devices increases the 
effectiveness (and hence, dangers) of app-based behavioural adverts. Similarly, the possibility of 
displaying adverts while offline, may result in consumers being served with the advert but not 
with the necessary information regarding its commercial and behavioural nature, thus presenting 
problems when it comes to compliance with the UCPD and the DCR. A similar challenge is 
presented by, the difficulty in distinguishing between app-content intended for adults from that 
that intended for minors. Further challenges are posed by the ‘freemium’ business model which 
may lead to misleadingly representing the app as free or failing to disclose that the app, although 
free, is collecting user personal data which is commercially exploited. These practices are 
prohibited by Articles 6-7 UCPD under which misleading actions and omissions are unfair 
commercial practices. It is those provisions that underpin some of the Principles devised by the 
OFT. Those principles, although not mandatory, provide a good indication of the way the OFT 
interprets the legislation at its disposal. Platforms and/or app developers would therefore be well 
inspired to comply with the said Principles or be prepared to face enforcement action. Finally, 
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issues of fairness of advertising are raised by in-app products or features. Those problems are 
linked to unauthorized in-app purchases, in particular those made by children, direct exhortations 
to children and other aggressive commercial practices. These are again tackled by the UCPD.139 
Importantly, the in-app environment may generally be engineered in such a way as to create and 
exploit addictive and/or compulsive tendencies of users towards in-app purchases. In this regard, 
the general (fairness) clause under Article 5(2) UCPD may be engaged, thereby ‘cleaning’ apps 
from those marketing tricks and techniques that may be found to go beyond the typical 
exploitation of consumer psychological traits inherent in acceptable advertising.  
It transpires that consumers using apps in the EU have, at their disposal, laws that are likely to 
protect them, although much remains to be done in order to clarify how the law does apply in 
practice. As the world of apps develops more legal challenges will come to fore. While 
consumers may momentarily be app-solutely protected, it will not be for long. No doubt, new 
apps models and marketing techniques will shortly come to challenge the legislations in place in 
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